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1. Introduction  
Today, our dependence on the internet has grown manifold. So has the need to protect our 
vast personal information accessible via web interfaces such as online passwords, corporate 
secrets, online banking accounts, and social networking accounts like Facebook. The 
appearance of botnets in the internet scene over the last decade, and their ever changing 
behavior has caused real challenges that cannot be easily remedied.  
According to literature, a botnet is defined to be a set of infected hosts (also called bots or 
zombies) that run autonomously and automatically, controlled by a botmaster (bot herder) 
who can co-ordinate his/her malicious intentions using the infected bots. Some of the 
prominent malicious tasks that can be credited to botnets include DDoS (Distributed denial-
of-service), spam, phishing, ransomwares and identity theft.  
In a botnet DDoS attack, the botmaster can command all its bots to attack a particular server 
(example: update.microsoft.com) at a particular date, time and for a duration via a malicious 
or anonymous proxy used as a stepping-stone to hide the actual commanding node. In a 
spam campaign, the nodes that form the bot network are responsible for sending spam by 
behaving as spam relay points, delivering spam mails to a list of intended victim email 
addresses selected by the botmaster. For example: a node which is part of a spam botnet 
could be sent a list of email addresses to spam for the day with a payload of the spam that is 
to be mailed. These spam messages could advertise pharmaceutical products and may also 
deliver further infection executables via email links or attachments to recruit more bots, as 
done by botnets such as Storm and Waledac. In a phishing scam, botnets are responsible for 
acting as web proxies or web servers to deliver hoax site content to benign users to gather 
their e-banking or credit card credentials. For example, the sites could host content which 
looks like a banking site requesting for login details credentials which when entered by the 
user, can be used by the botmaster to access legitimate banking sites. Eventually the funds 
are transferred to accounts that leave no trails (Nazario & Holz, 2008).  
Botnets such as Storm have been known to infect over 2 million hosts while Conficker has 
infected over 9 million hosts according to some estimates. As can be seen, the far reaching 
effects of malicious intentions of botnets and their masters are a real threat. 
This chapter will cover a concise survey of botnet detection systems as well as provide a 
novel mobile-agent based method that has been adapted from mobile-agent based intrusion 
detection systems, for handling botnets. We provide the necessary background needed to 
understand botnets such as the offensive techniques utilized by botnets; the defensive 
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
56 
techniques developed by researchers; and also focus on a mobile agent based technique to 
detect infected hosts. 
2. Botnet offense 
In order to better understand the challenges that the security community faces in order to 
dismantle botnets, we first need to understand how botnets function, and the many tools 
and techniques employed by them. 
2.1 Setting up a command and control server 
The first step in creating a botnet is to setup the Command and Control (C&C) server. This 
is the location where the infected hosts report to the botmaster, letting it know that a host 
has been infected successfully. This is also the location where the infected hosts retrieve the 
full list of commands that the infected bot should run. Section 2.3 covers some of the 
communication features of a C&C server. 
2.2 Bot lifecycle 
Unlike the initial advanced botnets such as Agobot which carried a list of exploits to perform 
on a vulnerable host and its entire command set at the time of initial infection, every 
advanced bot today uses multiple stages in order to form a botnet (Schiller et al., 2007; Gu et 
al., 2007). This was mainly done first, to avoid signature detection by network intrusion 
detection systems such as snort (Roesch, 1999) and second, to reduce the initial infection size 
of the bot binary to make it less traceable while using drive-by-download attacks. 
Stage 1 of a bot’s lifecycle is the initial infection/exploit of a host. In this step the bot binary 
has to first infect the host by attempting to exploit one or more security vulnerabilities that 
might pre-exist on a system. Section 2.4 provides further details on the associated techniques 
that botmasters could use in this step. Once infected, stage 2 is the process by which the bot 
reports back to the botmaster using the command and control (C&C) channel to inform him 
that the host has been successfully compromised. Information related to the host such as 
opened backdoors, host operation system settings and network capabilities are just some of 
the details that are reported back during this phase. In stage 3 the bot downloads new 
executables. This process is also referred to as egg downloading. This could be the component 
that detects and disables antivirus software, or could provide potential updates to the bot 
malware with its full command list to make it more functional. In stage 4 the downloaded 
malware is executed on the bot. The bot at this stage has become fully functional. In stage 5, 
the bot starts listening to the command-and-control channel to retrieve payload information 
from peers or servers and could execute the commands that are passed on using the 
payload. It is not necessary that the channel used in stage 3 is the same channel used in stage 
5. In stage 6, the bot could optionally report the results of executing the commands to the 
server. This feature is used by many botnets to track the functionality of the bot so that the 
botnet could be load-balanced. 
2.3 Botnet communication structure 
The most important component of a botnet that decides if it can be easily dismantled is its 
communication structure which is used to command and control the infected hosts of a 
botnet. The type of communication used between a bot client and its command-and-control 
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server or between any two bot clients can be differentiated into two types: Push-based 
commanding or pull-based commanding. Each method has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
In a push-based communication, the bot master “pushes” the command that the bots are to 
run. The advantage of push-based communication lies in the fact that botmasters can 
instantaneously ask bots to perform a certain task. This allows for tighter control. However, 
the inherent disadvantage of such a method is the amount of traffic that can be observed 
leaving the server, or the tight timing correlation between various monitored nodes that are 
part of the same botnet, leading to easier detection of infected hosts. This weakness has been 
utilized by most botnet detection techniques such as Botsniffer (Gu et al., 2008). An example 
of push-based communication is the use of IRC servers for command-and-control. 
In a pull-based communication, each bot is allowed to periodically retrieve the next 
command to run from a server. This helps not only to avoid flash-crowds at a command-
and-control server, but the injection of random delays in command retrieval from bot to 
server makes it more difficult to trace a command-and-control server. This allows the server 
to hide behind traditional web traffic. Most existing botnets used for spamming (5 of top 9) 
use http protocol, a pull-based communication, to masquerade communication as legitimate 
users (Steward, 2009). In addition to the primary channel of communications, bots also have 
a secondary communication usually in the form of backdoors created by Trojans/bot 
software installed in each infected host. This channel is only used by the botmaster if the 
primary communication channel has been compromised. 
We now elaborate a little on some of the more common communication structures used by 
botnets. 
2.3.1 IRC (Internet Relay Chat) 
In the beginning, most botnets used a centralized approach for managing botnets (Bacher et 
al., 2005). This was done using the IRC (internet relay chat) protocol or modified versions of 
the protocol using freely available sources such as UnrealIRCd (unrealircd, 2010). As per 
(Schiller et al., 2007), the main reasons for using IRC were its interactive nature for two way 
communication between server-client; readily available source code for easy modifications; 
ability to control multiple botnets using nicknames for bots and password protected 
channels; and redundancy achieved by linking several servers together.   
Most IRC servers are modified from the original IRC protocol so that not all clients are 
visible to each channel member, or the server only listens to commands entered by the 
botmaster. Most bots parse the channel subject to be the command issued by the botmaster 
(Bacher et al., 2005). However, since these servers become the single point of failure and are 
easily detected, botnets have moved to other decentralized methods of control such as P2P; 
use of other less detectable protocols (http web servers); or use of IRC in combination to 
DNS fast-flux techniques, as explained in section 2.4.1. This was mainly due to the increased 
ability of the research community to reverse engineer the bot binary using tools such as IDA 
pro (Hex-rays, 2010) and mimic the behavior of a bot by joining and monitoring a botnet 
(Bacher et al., 2005; Rajab et al., 2006). 
2.3.2 Web based botnet 
The most prominent communication structure for botnets after IRC is the used of web 
servers. This is mainly done since most firewalls cannot distinguish between web-based bot 
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traffic, and legitimate web traffic. The botmaster could be informed via an http request of 
the backdoor port to be used for communication along with a password to connect to the bot 
in case a secondary channel is required for communication. 
2.3.3 P2P (peer-to-peer) 
Probably the most complex botnet that had been studied to use a P2P scheme was the 
Storm/Zhelatin/Pecomm/Nuwar botnet and its variants. This botnet used a P2P approach to 
communicate commands between its bot members (Holz et al., 2008) based on the edonkey 
(Overnet protocol based on the Kademlia P2P algorithm) protocol followed by its custom 
stormnet (XOR encrypted communications) protocol to communicate. Using an off-the-shelf 
protocol that relied on unauthenticated publish-subscribe system allowed researchers to 
infiltrate the botnet. The number of botnets that use the P2P approach is less mainly due to 
the complicated nature of the C&C structure and due to the fact that once defenders have 
control of one infected host, it is easier for them to detect other infected peers connecting to 
it. Nugache is another P2P based botnet that uses encrypted peer communications. A 
noteworthy feature of Storm is the additional feature of automatically attacking anyone 
attempting to track it i.e. any storm infected node that was not behaving appropriately 
would be DDoSed by the system. This made it increasingly difficult for researchers to 
understand how the botnet functioned (Holz et al., 2008).  
2.3.4 Other communication protocols and proposed botnet features 
Botnets have also been detected to use one of many other uncommon protocols such as 
instant messaging for C&C. Using instant messaging for C&C has the drawback of being 
easily tracked and taken down by the instant messaging provider.  ftp dropzones for banking 
Trojans have also been observed by (Holz et al., 2009). As per the authors, botnets used for 
stealing banking credentials submit keylogged data from phishing attacks into dropzones. 
The authors discovered a few authentication free dropzones during their investigations. 
Some researchers have also proposed advanced techniques that could be used by botnets in 
the future. (Singh et al., 2008) discusses the use of email as C&C by using a combination of 
encryption and steganography in email content. The email content could be send to the 
user’s inbox or spam folder at the direction of the botmaster by picking the right keywords. 
(Bambenek & Klus, 2008) proposed the possibility of using RSS feeds or XML for 
communication via websites maintained by botmasters, or public bulletin boards not 
controlled by the botmaster. (Hund et al., 2008) proposed a new bot design called Rambot 
that uses peer-to-peer technology in addition to using strong cryptography (2048 bit RSA 
keys) where the public key of botmaster would be hardcoded into the bot binary. Use of 
Diffie-Hellman symmetric key between bot-bot communications was also proposed by the 
authors in addition to the possibility of using a credit-point system to build trust among 
bots. The authors also discuss about peers only sharing partial peer lists with other bots to 
avoid detection of all peers in the botnet.  In order to avoid allowing defenders to simulate 
multiple nodes on a single host, the authors also discuss about presenting a challenge(5-15 
minute task)  to any node before it communicates. This however has the drawback of the bot 
being detected by regular users. (Wang et al., 2007) proposes concepts similar to (Hund et 
al., 2008) in the use of asymmetric keys for bot-botmaster communication, symmetric keys 
for bot-bot communication and the use of peer-list exchange where only a partial list of 
peers are exchanged only during reinfection attempts. (Vogt et al., 2007) proposes creating 
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infections where thousands of smaller botnets are created with each having its own C&C 
server. Also all commands require a decryption key based on both the public key of the 
botmaster and another key that is partitioned such that each botnet has a partial key Ki. 
Defenders would need to infiltrate each separate botnet to gather the entire decryption key.  
2.4 Infecting the user 
The primary step that creates the botnet is the initial infection of the user which converts a 
clean host into a bot. Users can be infected in one of three ways. 
Drive-by-downloads 
As noted in numerous papers (Provos et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006; Ikinci et al., 2008; Siefert 
et al., 2007; Provos et al., 2008) drive-by-downloads have become an emergent threat that 
exploit weaknesses often seen in web browsers and browser plugins.  
In this process, the user is infected by a malicious link embedded in the site that based on 
the user-agent (browser) starts off a series of attacks (attack vector) to download malware 
into the user’s machine without any acceptance by the user other than to have visited the 
site. This malicious site could be hosted by a malicious entity; could have 3rd party 
advertisement links which load malicious content; or be a legitimate site that has been 
infected earlier. 3rd Party advertisements could include the action of syndication (Daswani & 
Stoppelman, 2007) by which space on a site is sold for advertisement links to 3rd party sites 
that serve the ad content. Legitimate sites could be infected by a SQL injection attack which 
would then contain malicious iframe pointers to malicious servers. Unlike network scanning 
for vulnerabilities, which are blocked by firewalls and NATs, drive-by-download uses a 
pull-based technique that bypasses most filters. (Provos et al., 2008) notes that many of the 
infected hosts show connections to IRC servers or HTTP requests soon after infection 
confirming the fact that drive-by-downloads lead to creation of botnets. The malware or 
malicious iframe pointers are usually obfuscated within the html source. Instead of 
reinventing the exploits, these malicious links use ready-made exploit packs such as Mpack, 
IcePack or EL Fiesta that contain customized infection vectors. Though (Provos et al., 2008) 
mentions scanning well known URLs to check for maliciousness, a URL may seem benign in 
the beginning during initial scan, but might start behaving maliciously at a later time. The 
authors reported the presence of over 3 million malicious URLs detected over a 10 month 
period, and 1.3% of search results returning malicious URLs in Google searches. 
Malicious attachments (social engineering) 
A few botnets such as Storm & Waledac use social engineering as the attack vector. In this 
process, users are emailed a web link, hosted by a node in the bot network that a benign 
user would be enticed to visit. Once the URL is visited, the botmaster uses social 
engineering such as the need for missing flash plug-in or video codec to entice the user into 
downloading an executable and thus infecting the user. The use of custom packers and 
added encryption makes it almost impossible for antivirus software to detect maliciousness 
of the downloaded binary. 
Vulnerable hosts 
Most botnet attack vectors still target hosts that have not been fully patched. For example, 
some of the initial botnets such as SDBot, Rbot, Agobot,  Spybot and Mytob were formed due 
to various windows vulnerabilities. Similarly the recent worm having a botnet commanding 
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structure (Downadup/Conficker/Kido) that exploits MS08-067 spreads primarily due to 
inadequate patching.  As pointed out by (Brumley et al., 2007; Brumley et al., 2008), attack 
vectors for a vulnerability can be created within hours of a patch being made available by a 
vendor. The difference between a patched and an unpatched version of the software allows 
malware authors to detect the underlying vulnerability that unpatched systems are 
vulnerable to.  
2.5 Advanced botnet features 
2.5.1 Obfuscation 
The primary reason for using obfuscation is to make it difficult for botnet defenders to 
detect and tear down the inner functioning of a bot malware by simple signature 
matching. This is accomplished in many ways. For example, web-based malware (used for 
drive-by-downloads) uses JavaScript obfuscation to hide the attack vector. Web based 
malware is easier to obfuscate than memory corruption vulnerabilities and cannot be 
caught by state of the art polymorphic worm detectors such as Hamsa (Li et al., 2006) and 
Polygraph (Newsome et al., 2005). Another method includes the use of packing followed 
by encryption of bot binaries that causes bot binaries to go undetected by signature 
detectors. For example, storm is packed every minute by a custom packer built into its 
code whereby the size and thus MD5 hash no longer match to previous bot binary 
samples of the same malware. 
2.5.2 Fast-flux 
Most advanced botnets (Storm, Waledac) used primarily for phishing and spam use fast-flux 
techniques to hide the actual servers responsible for updated copies of the malware. In a 
fast-flux technique, the DNS to IP mapping of the download location of the malware 
constantly changes such that blocking an IP address does not really help, or correlating 
information about a particular infection based on just the IP is no longer useful enough. 
Some botnets use double fast flux using multihoming to change both the A record and NS 
record of DNS (Holz et al., 2009; Nazario & Holz, 2008; Siefert et al., 2007).  
2.5.3 Virtual-machine detection 
Quite a few malicious bot applications have inbuilt functionality to check if the host that has 
been infected is running in a virtual machine. Some characteristics include registry entries 
caused as artifacts of running various virtual machine software; list of running processes 
and services; or attempt remote timing attacks (Franklin et al., 2008) where the bot code runs 
a set of instructions in a loop leading to difference in results compared to a real system.  It 
has also been noted by researchers in the virtual machine field that virtual machines will 
continue to be detected regardless of hardware support for virtualization (Garfinkel et al., 
2007) mainly due to the difference in goals of the virtualization community.  
2.5.4 Rootkits 
Most bot code packages such as Rustock, Storm and rxbot uses rootkits to hide its presence to 
antivirus and malware detection tools. In these cases the bot binary package contains an 
executable which causes inline-function-hooking of important windows kernel dll functions 
such as kernel32.dll to hide the actual bot binary files from detection. An example rootkit 
used by hackers include Hacker Defender.  
www.intechopen.com
Advanced Methods for Botnet Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
61 
2.5.5 Random generation of domain names 
Some newer botnets such as Conficker and Kraken/Bobax use random generation of domain 
names in search of the Command and Control servers. While Kraken walked through its 
generated list in serial order, Conficker generates a new list every day that has not been 
registered yet. Once the first C&C server is connected to, Conficker could activate its botnet 
structure (Pierce, 2008). This feature of trying to connect to non-existent servers could act as 
a give-away in detecting bot infections. 
3. Botnet defense 
In trying to keep pace with botnets, defenders have constantly tried to mitigate the harmful 
intentions of botnets by coming up with novel solutions, targeted at the core architectural 
footprint of botnets. Some of the solutions use static analysis techniques via reverse 
engineering the bot binaries using programs such as IDA pro or peryleyez (Holz et al., 2008; 
Grizzard et al., 2007; Chiang & Lloyd, 2007). Other approaches have used a dynamic 
analysis approach using tools such as cwsandbox (Sunbelt, 2010) or norman sandbox by 
performing windows API hooking; or performing system wide dynamic taint tracking 
(Tucek et al., 2007; Yin et al., 2007).  
Botnet emulation approaches testbeds such as EMUlab/ DETER/ WAIL (Barford & 
Blodgett, 2007) have also been used to emulate an entire botnet by setting up command-and-
control servers, infected clients and local DNS resolvers.  
Work related to the area of drive-by-downloads has been done by (Provos et al., 2007; 
Provos et al., 2008) using honeynets to monitor URLs that might be malicious. These 
honeynets browse the URL using internet explorer via client-honeypots and track the 
number of new processes created, number of registries modified, and number of files creates 
due to visiting a site. The use of honey-clients to monitor changes while visiting URLs such 
as the Strider Honey monkey project (Wang et al., 2006), the Monkey spider project  (Ikinci 
et al., 2008) or the use of behavior analysis tools such as Capture-BAT (Seifert, 2008) fall 
under the category of detecting drive-by-downloads. DNS monitor approaches have been 
used for lookup behaviors commonly used by bots using active methods such as DNS 
hijacking (Dagon et al., 2006) or passive methods such as DNS Black listing (Ramachandran 
et al, 2006). We now discuss some of the broader approaches that have been taken for botnet 
detection. 
3.1 Botnet detection using honeypots 
The main research methodology to detect and infiltrate botnets in the past few years has 
been via the use of honeypots. A honeypot can be loosely defined to be a machine that is 
closely monitored to watch for potential infiltration. The honeypot machine could be a real 
vulnerable machine but is usually a machine running in a virtual environment. The use of 
honeypots lies in the fact that any traffic that tries to penetrate or contact a honeypot can be 
considered as inherently malicious since by default, honeypots do not by themselves contact 
other hosts unless instructed to do so and hence should not exhibit any network traffic. The 
use of more than one honeypot in a network is called a honeynet. The purpose of a honeypot 
defines its type. Some of them include (Riden & Seifert, 2008): 
Client honeypots: A Client honeypot is a machine that looks for malicious servers, behaving 
as a client. Some of the prominent projects in this area includes Strider Honeymonkeys (Wang 
et al., 2006), Monkey Spider (Ikinci et al., 2008), Capture HPC (Seifert, 2008), Shelia  
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(Rocaspana, 2007) and the MITRE Honeyclient (Mitre, 2007).  Most of these projects use links 
(URL) gathered from spam traps as seed values, and then actively visit the sites using a 
virtual machine that contains different levels of patching. This allows the system to detect 
the vulnerability attacked, and the configuration of the vulnerable machine. 
High Interaction Honeypot: 3rd generation honeywall (‘Roo”)  (Roo, 2005) is a high interaction 
honeypot that allows the attacker to interact at all levels. The honeywall is placed between a 
honeynet and the outside world, collecting data from network. Roo uses snort-inline (snort-
inline, 2005) to block all outgoing attack traffic from the honeynet. 
Low Interaction Honeypot: A low interaction honeypot emulates vulnerabilities rather than 
hosting an actual vulnerable system. Thus these types of honeypots can be easily detected if 
an attacker interacts with this node. These are mainly useful for automated worm like bots 
that spread. Some known examples include: 
• Nepenthes (Baecher, 2006): Emulates multiple windows vulnerabilities on various 
windows ports via stateful finite state machine. It has the ability to emulate 16,000 IP 
addresses on a single machine. Meant to collect self replicating malware automatically. 
Contains 21 different vulnerability modules. Has a module for parsing shell codes that 
are XOR encoded and a module for retrieving binary from remote server obtained by 
parsing shell code.  
• Honeyd (Provos, 2007b): Implements a small daemon which creates virtual hosts on a 
network. Allows one to create a simulated network of over 60,000 hosts on a single host 
allowing real hosts to co-exist among virtual hosts, thus making it extremely difficult 
for attackers to track down the real hosts in the network. Each host feature can be 
configured separately. (Li et al., 2008) used one year worth of honeynet data captured 
using half darknet sensors and half honeyd sensors to reach the conclusion that most 
botnet nodes scan randomly rather than scanning just a specific local IP range in most 
cases. 
3.2 Spamming botnet detection 
Given that the primary utility of botnets is in sending spam, many researchers have looked 
into analyzing botnets that are used exclusively for sending spam such as the Storm, Srizbi 
and Rustock botnets. Though the size of spamming botnets has reduced significantly due to 
internet service providers blocking C&C servers as well as the domain providers for these 
botnets, spamming botnets remain an active threat (Steward, 2009). (Ramachandran et al., 
2008) used a DNS blacklisting technique (DNSBL) where it creates a graph of nodes that are 
in any way linked to the known srizbi botnet. If a bot belonging to srizbi queries a large 
DNSBL of an internet service provider, correlation of the querying node or the one being 
queried with the srizbi list gives a list of new peers who are infected by srizbi. This process 
could be repeated multiple rounds to find out all associated bots which send spam. 
Spamming botnets have also been detected based on using hotmail spam mail as seed data 
and detecting source of the mail using domain-agnostic signature detection (Xie et al., 2008;  
Brodsky & Brodsky, 2007).  
3.3 Network-based botnet detection 
Some botnet detection systems have relied on detecting bot traffic using network level data. 
This is mainly done using network sniffing intrusion detection tools such as snort in 
addition to other network flow monitors.  
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Bothunter (Gu et al., 2007) uses a vertical correlation algorithm which tries to capture the 
different steps of a bot life-cycle. The 5 stages of a bot used in Bothunter are Inbound scanning 
where network monitoring is done to see if an internal host is scanned for from external 
host;  Exploit usage where an exploit packet is sent from external to internal host; egg 
downloading where a binary of the malware is retrieved by the infected host from the outside 
network; Outbound bot coordination dialog where Command and Control traffic is observed; 
Outbound attack propagation where the internal host attempts to attack an external  host. The 
system throws a warning if atleast 2 outbound bot attempt stages are seen or evidence of 
localhost infection followed by a single outward communication from infected host is seen. 
The authors use a combination of snort and anomaly detection tools called SCADE and 
SLADE for detection. 
BotSniffer (Gu et al., 2008a) uses network-based anomaly detection approach to detect C&C 
channel for IRC in a local area network by implementing modules as snort preprocessors. 
Their algorithm is based on the fact that IRC has a tight spatial-temporal correlation on the 
size and duration of packet lengths observed during an n-gram (2-gram) analysis for 
homogeneity check of communication packets. 
BotMiner (Gu et al., 2008b) uses a horizontal correlation algorithm to detect bot traffic which 
detects both centralized command-and-control structures and peer-to-peer command-and-
control structures. The authors partition every network flow into an Activity-plane (A-
plane) and a Communication plane (C-plane) based on the type of traffic. A-plane is 
monitored by snort and modules from the BotHunter program. C-plane uses binning 
technique to read four network quantities such as flows per hour, packets per flow, average 
number of bytes per packet and average number of bytes per second. Once flows that have 
the same C-plane state are clustered, a cross-correlation plane is calculated to figure out 
which nodes are part of the same botnets based on a scoring function.  
(Strayer et al., 2008) uses network monitoring to try to correlate traffic in a local area 
network to detect bots based on the tight correlation in the timing of IRC-based bot traffic to 
the server. The authors used a modified version of the Kaiten bot to connect to their own 
internal IRC server (UnrealIRCd) to collect data via TCPdump.  
Some IRC-based botnet detection work has also been done by (Karasaridis et al., 2007) 
which looks at traffic flows obtained by a Tier-1 ISP and correlates the data to locate the 
commanding server and hosts. 
Some botnet defense techniques rely on cooperation from every Autonomous System (AS) 
which is currently not feasible due to privacy issues. (Liu et al., 2008) proposes the use of 
Stop-It servers that are supposed to stop internal nodes from performing denial of service 
attacks if reported by another autonomous system. Similarly (Simon et al., 2007) also relies 
on setting an evil-bit for traffic arriving from an autonomous system that cannot be trusted. 
Overall the system behaves similar to the system proposed by (Liu et al., 2008).  
(Stinson & Mitchell, 2008) discusses the evasion techniques that can be used to defeat the 
various network based botnet detection approaches used. They come to the conclusion that 
network-based botnet detection systems that rely on packet timings and size of packets can 
be easily defeated by random modifications to the measured variables associated to a 
network packet. Similarly (Cooke et al., 2005) reports that there is no simple connection 
based invariant useful for network detection. Their conclusion was based on data collected 
from the Internet Motion Sensor project. They measured that the length of the outgoing 
connection from bot to botmaster varied from 9 hours to less than a second. Some botnets 
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had traffic that was encrypted along with random noise insertions to thwart signature 
detection. 
3.4 Behavior analysis based botnet detection 
More recently, researchers have attempted to detect botnets by tracking their network and 
host behavior. (Bayer et al., 2009) recently proposed the correlation of behavior analysis of 
malware via clustering of behavior of host system calls via their ANUBIS dynamic analysis 
tool and the use of Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) clustering algorithm. Their tool works 
by performing an offline analysis of a malware sample similar to CWSandBox. The authors 
mention that capturing behavior at a system call level causes data explosion and increased 
false positives and negatives if an adversary has the knowledge that a system is tracked at a 
system call level. 
(Bailey et al., 2007) uses hierarchical clustering based on measuring normalized compression 
distance where distances are measured by computing the zlib compressing of features, 
stored in random order. Each feature is represented by registry modifications made, 
processes created, file modifications made.  
(Rieck et al., 2008) uses support vector machines to calculate which malware group a 
malicious executable represents, based on supervised learning using 10-fold cross validation 
of certain bot families. They compute feature vectors computed from CWSandbox reports. 
(Lee & Mody, 2006) perform k-medoid clustering of events generated by running malicious 
executables. Each event is represented by file modifications or registry changes. They use 
edit distance of events among executables to cluster. They showed that edit distance 
measurements for distance do not work when the number of events goes higher than 500. 
Using k-medoid also has the drawback that the actual number of clusters has to be 
predetermined. Having a k which is less than the actual number of clusters cause outliers to 
be included, thus significantly impacting the cluster features. 
(Gao et al., 2005) had proposed the use of applying DNA behavior distance of sequence of 
system call subsets by calculating distance between system call phrases of a given process and 
its replica. Their approach works by computing the edit distance between any two system 
call phrases, where a phrase is a sequence of system calls. However their work has 
limitations as the distance between system calls can be artificially increased by malicious 
adversaries by making unnecessary system calls. 
4. Agent technology 
Though various methodologies have existed for botnet detection, the use of agent 
technology has been mostly overlooked. Given the distributed nature of botnets, and their 
modular structure allowing for constant updates, it is more intuitive to use a similar 
technology that is inherently distributed and allows similar kind of code updates for 
defensive purposes. The need for a clear understanding of agents is necessitated due to the 
fact that the system that we have developed and extended, is layered on top of an agent 
platform, Grasshopper (Bäumer & Magedanz, 1999), based on the first mobile agent standard 
MASIF (Mobile Agent System Interoperability Facility), an interoperability standard that 
allows agents from different mobile agent platforms to interact with each other. Researchers 
could use other mobile-agent based platforms such as Aglets that allow for similar 
functionality. The term agent or software agent is usually deciphered well in the artificial 
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intelligence community, where it stands for a program that can behave autonomously to 
perform a multitude of dynamic tasks based on the logistics that have been programmed 
into it by a user. 
4.1 Agent classification 
Based on the mobility of agents, they can be classified into three main types: 
Static Agents: The first is the concept of static agents. Static agents are fragments of code that 
do not move to different locations, and stay at a constant position throughout its life cycle. 
Semi-Mobile Agents: Semi-mobile agents, as the name suggests, have some mobility. They are 
in fact an inherent type of mobile agents, which are created at one logical or physical 
location, but are moved to another location for its functional life cycle. 
Mobile Agents: Mobile agents are a fragment of code, which can move around, from host to 
host during its life cycle depending on the runtime task allocated to it. Mobile agents are 
based on a terminology, well known in literature as mobile code (Fuggetta et al., 1998). The 
term mobile code can be defined as the capability to change the binding between the pieces 
of code, and the location where they are executed. 
The scope of the advantages or disadvantages of using any of the above mentioned agent 
types can vary based on the functionality of the agent based system that is being deployed. 
If latency is a big issue in the system, one should opt for static and/or semi-mobile agents. 
This is because the greater the mobility of an agent, the higher the latency introduced into 
the system caused by the time required to create it at a new location and to transfer the 
runtime state of the agent. If the host where the agent runs is very fragile or more prone to 
destruction or tampering, it would be best to use a mobile agent rather than a static agent, as 
it is easier for mobile agents to find a new location to run at than static agents. 
4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of agents 
The use of mobile agents offers wide advantages especially in distributed systems that 
cannot be overlooked. Some of the advantages offered by agents have been clearly listed in 
(Bieszczad et al., 1998). The major categories of these are summarized as follows: 
Reduction in Network Traffic: In case of mobile agents, the agents themselves move to data. i.e. 
we move the agent code to the data rather than moving the data to the agent code. This 
allows for a dramatic reduction in the amount of bandwidth consumed in the log correlation 
process (explained in later sections) as data is almost always larger than the few kilobyte 
size of agents in general. 
Asynchronous autonomous interaction: This is vital in a network where network connections 
are volatile, such as wireless networks. In such cases, the agent could migrate to a mobile 
device to gather data. Even if the connection breaks, the agent could continue processing 
data on the mobile device and report back whenever the connection is reestablished. This 
adds to the agent's capability to work in a fault tolerant mode.  
Software Upgrades: Usually in order to update software on multiple hosts, an administrator 
has to first stop the server functionality, then uninstall the old version of the software, and 
then reinstall the new version. The entire software system has to be stopped for upgrades. 
The advantage of mobile agents or agents in general in this situation is that if each 
component of the upgraded software is managed by an agent, then it is as easy as disabling 
the old agent and deploying a new agent which has the required functionality. In this way 
one could avoid bringing down the entire system and instead stop just a single agent-based 
component. 
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Functionality in heterogeneous environments: Most agents today can work in heterogeneous 
environments. This is due to the fact that these agents are usually written in a language 
which is portable to multiple platforms, such as java or perl. Since agents sit on top of an 
agent framework, they can easily function regardless of if the host runs a version of Linux or 
Windows operating system. The significant reduction in costs of placing agent frameworks 
in hosts over the past few years have added to the benefits of running agents. 
Just like there are advantages to using agents, there are also drawbacks to using agents. The 
applicability of advantages or disadvantages to using agents is based immensely on the 
specific user needs or goals that have been put forward. The shortcomings of using a mobile 
agent-based system have been clearly summarized by (Vigna, 2004). 
Agent Security: The one and only reason that has hindered the wide usage of mobile agents 
in the real world has been its security constraints. One of the key problems associated with 
mobile agent security is the malicious host problem i.e. how much trust can be placed on a 
host where the agent travels to, given that the agent may have valuable data. Other security 
concerns that have been mentioned in literature include the concept of malicious agents 
(Vigna et al., 2002) where given the availability of an agent platform in a host, how much 
trust can be placed on the agent that travels to the host to gather information? This problem 
has been solved in the agent-security field by allowing a host to run only certain digitally 
signed agents. Last but not the least, agents can be tampered with which means, a legitimate 
agent could be brainwashed while traveling from host to host. (Vigna et al., 2002) has 
provided a means for auditing an agents trail to detect attacks that modify agents legitimate 
access permissions and authorization mechanisms for the aglets mobile agent platform. 
Lack of Shared Language: Even though many tasks have been overtaken by FIPA (The 
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) to create a standard ACL (Agent communication 
language), most agent platforms do not adhere to this language. Hence it is hard for agents 
to communicate with each other when they are based on different platforms. 
Required Agent Platform: Any piece of agent code available today needs to run on an agent 
platform that contributes to the control and deployment of agents. For example, our system 
has to use the Grasshopper agent platform to execute its tasks currently. Similarly, to run 
java applets, the system has to have a java runtime environment available. The dependence 
of mobile agents on an agent platform is an extra requirement that has to be made, without 
which they cannot function. The problem is further compounded by the fact that not all 
agent platforms follow a given set of rules and procedures thus hindering interoperability 
issues even with the existence of standards such as MASIF. 
4.3 Intrusion detection system data correlation 
Most detection systems today use the process of log correlation, which is a process that takes 
the alerts generated by multiple intrusion detection systems and produce a brief report on 
the network being protected (Valeur et al., 2004). The advantage of this method is that if 
there are multiple intrusion detector sensors deployed in the network, on the occurrence of 
an intrusion attack, each of these sensors would generate a report on the intrusion type. 
Allowing log correlation of the information generated by all these sensors would provide a 
system administrator with a compact but detailed report on the attack allowing him or her 
to pinpoint the vulnerability easily.  
In the conventional log correlation model, distributed sensors, after gathering the data, send 
all the alerts to a centralized location for correlation purposes. But the major disadvantage of 
this model is that if the amount of logs generated is large, it would clog the network system 
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in a low-bandwidth network. Also a centralized approach would overload a node that 
receives too many correlation tasks at a given time, causing system overload and hence 
delay in producing the analyzed results.  
4.4 Agent based security systems 
The earliest relevant work in this area was started by Purdue University's CERIAS (The 
Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security) group in 1995 
when they put forward a proposal for building an autonomous agent based security model 
by using genetic programming (Crosbie & Spafford, 1995). This was followed up by their 
work in implementing the earlier proposal (Balasubramaniyan et al., 1998).This system was 
called AAFID (Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection) written earlier in Perl, Tcl/Tk 
and C, and later revised and written in the perl language to make it more portable. (Helmer 
et al., 1998) used an anomaly detection technique by using the Ripper algorithm on sendmail 
system calls. The architecture mimicked a portion of the Java Agents for Meta-Learning 
(JAM) project (Stolfo et al., 1997). A distributed hierarchical IDS was proposed by (Mell & 
McLarnon, 1999) that tries to randomize the location of agents and decentralizing directory 
services. The system also resurrects agents killed by an intruder as there always exists 
multiple copies that track the original agent and vice versa. The Micael IDS was proposed by 
(Queiroz et al., 1999). They proposed an additional feature of periodically checking if all 
agents are active in the system. Another prominent work that detects intrusions using 
mobile agents is the IDA system (Asaka et al., 1999). This system tries to backtrack intrusion 
attempts by looking into MLSI (Mark Left by Suspected Intruders) left at each host. They 
also emphasize tracking the steps that an attacker takes. 
The Sparta system by (Krügel et al., 2001; Krügel & Toth, 2002) is the most extensive work 
done till date on using mobile agents and intrusion detection. Sparta, which stands for 
Security Policy Adaptation Reinforced Through Agents, is an architecture that is capable of 
monitoring a network to detect intrusions and security policy violations by providing a 
query like functionality to reconstruct patterns of events across multiple hosts. This is a 
network-based IDS that correlates data from multiple sensors located throughout the 
network. The authors have created an EQL (Event Query Language) with syntax similar to 
SQL (Sequence Query Language) used in databases.  
Other mobile agent based IDS's include a P2P based IDS (Ramachandran & Hart, 2004) that 
works in a neighborhood watch manner where each agent looks after other agents in its 
vicinity by using a voting procedure to take action against a compromised agent; the MA-
IDS system (Li et al., 2004) which uses encrypted communication between the mobile agents 
in the system, and use a threshold mechanism to detect the probability for each intrusion 
depending on the quantity of each intrusion type obtained allowing it to learn in a one 
dimensional method. Some other mobile agent based IDS's include a position paper (Aslam 
et al., 2001) that claims to work on D'Agents environment; and work by (Foukia et al., 2001; 
Foukia et al., 2003) which uses a social insect metaphor and immune systems to model an 
intrusion detection system. 
5. Agent-based botnet detection 
Based on our previous experience on mobile agent based intrusion detection systems (Alam 
et al., 2005; Alam & Vuong, 2007), and an in-depth understanding of the behavior of botnets, 
we believe the appropriate approach to defend against botnets is to adapt a mobile-agent 
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based paradigm in combination with current host monitoring techniques, to detect bot 
infected hosts based on bot behavior analysis. 
Our proposed approach predominantly would work for a local or remote environment with 
a single administrative entity with access to network level data of monitored hosts and 
optionally, access to the host machine via mobile-agent middleware if host-based bot 
behavior features are need. We use network and host behavior monitoring of hosts to detect 
bot infections based on calculating feature vectors stored as a bot DNA. 
As mentioned in previous sections, each botnet exhibits certain traits/features. For example, 
the storm botnet used technique of fast-flux; used a peer-to-peer modeling based on edonkey 
(kademlia) protocol; used rootkits; certain variants exhibited detection of virtual machines; 
and infected bots either are used to DDoS, send phishing emails, or advertisements. We 
believe that each of these attributes could be considered a feature of the botnet. Some of the 
features describe the communication methods of a botnet while others describe their activity 
(Gu et al., 2008). Some of these can be detected using network monitoring while others by 
monitoring host changes. Each variant of a bot over time modifies some of its functionality 
(features), but the change is subtle from variant to variant in most cases. There are certain 
exceptions, such as Conficker.C which retains only 15 percent of its code intact from Conficker.B 
(Porras et al., 2009) and extensively modifies both its network and host behavior.  
With our primary goals to: 
1. detect hosts that exhibit botnet traits with a certain confidence level, and  
2. detect which bot an infected host behaves like,  
we believe that our first goal can be captured by calculating an infection score based on 
weighted botnet features exhibited by a host. The weights could be calculated based on using 
machine learning methods such as support vector machines (SVM) on predominant bot 
families. Our second goal can be accomplished by first learning the behavior of botnet 
infected hosts by capturing host and network behavior of known bot infections. This is 
followed by converting the behavior to a set of features represented as a vector stored in 
synthetic DNA format, allowing application of clustering or hashing algorithms as 
discussed in section 3.4. 
5.1 Mapping bot feature vector 
In order to apply the botnet detection problem to DNA, we map labeled buckets 
representing the range of values exhibited per bot feature/attribute. The purpose of using 
marked bins is to emphasize the more bot-like feature a host exhibits. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Assigning labels to botnet attributes 
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For example, if an infected node exhibits fast-flux, we only need two possible attribute 
states: yes or no. But measuring features such as the rate of outgoing connection, or average 
packet sizes cannot be captured by a yes/no solution. This can be solved to an extent by using 
a bucket/binning technique by partitioning such numbers into multiple marked bins. 
Whereas there exists a small number (4) of allowed variations in DNA nucleotides, it 
reduces the ability to measure accuracy in case of botnet detection. An example labeling is 
shown in Fig. 1. One also has to assign appropriate bin ranges that distinguish benign traffic 
from bot-like traffic. These are some of the challenges we are trying to solve based on 
measuring current bot features. 
5.2 Sequencing of hosts 
A system administrator would keep multiple DNA sequences of each host in its network: a 
set of sequences representing network-based DNA and a set representing host-based DNA. 
We partition the space into two since there might be cases when only one set of sequences 
are available. For example cellular devices using local wifi access cannot contribute to a 
host-based sequencing due to the absence of host-monitoring applications on the device in 
some cases. Fig. 2 shows an example DNA of a host as maintained by the administrator. 
Two hosts that exhibit similar DNA sequences behave similarly. Thus if a host shows DNA 
sequencing similar to a bot DNA sequence with subtle mutations, we know the type of 
infection and can mark the infected host. Similarly if a host exhibits DNA sequences similar 
to innocuous DNA, we know it is clean. 
 
 
Fig. 2. An example of the DNA structure maintained per host basis 
5.3 Capturing the attributes 
The effectiveness of our solution is based on selecting the appropriate network or host 
attributes exhibited by botnets. These lists of attributes are based on the behavior depicted 
by various botnets over time as discussed in sections earlier. One or more of the attributes 
requires maintaining some sort of state information. Table 1 provides some of the higher 
layer network features that are currently tracked. 
 
Fast-flux TTL, Rate of failed connections to ip, Rate of failed connection to dns, IRC, 
(Incoming http request, Outgoing http response, Outgoing http request, (Failed 
http response, Successful http response)), Incoming network scanning, (Outgoing 
network scanning, (Outgoing network scanning, Rate of Scanning)), (Retrieve 
Binary, (Binary MD5 match, Size of Binary)), (P2P traffic, Active connection rates, 
P2p active connections), Source IP spoofing, Outgoing SMTP traffic 
Table 1. Network features tracked 
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5.4 Depth of attributes 
As shown in Fig. 3, the depth at which a collected attribute resides, decides the length of the 
feature vector, and associated runtime and memory costs. The depth of the feature also 
decides if a bot can be appropriately distinguished or categorized under a known botnet. 
This is a trade-off that has to be kept into consideration. If the features vector comprises a 
sequence of system call API, this would cause a feature vector explosion (Bayer et al., 2009). 
In order to tackle this issue, some have abstracted system call objects (Bayer et al., 2009) , or 
created feature vector generated from system registry changes, file read/write and 
processes created for host-based attributes (Bailey et al., 2007; Rieck et al., 2008; Lee & Mody, 
2006).  
The attribute collection strategy regarding host-based behavior is based on the decisions of 
the researcher designing the agents. We envision having a multi-tiered strategy for host-
based attributes where some attributes are collected at a higher layer than others depending 
on required time sensitivity. 
 
Fig. 3. Feature vector size vs. level of abstraction 
5.5 Network attributes  
A network-based DNA could be computed by capturing network packets by network-based 
packet filters such as snort-inline by monitoring all network connections between internal 
hosts and the external network. The primary advantage of snort-inline is that it allows active 
dropping of network packets if needed based on snort rules triggered.  
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We envision that one would need two sets of network attributes. Those that can be 
computed based on just packet header traces, and those that can be computed via deep 
packet inspection. The difficulty in capturing the later is the amount of encrypted channels 
used by botnets today. Due to the extensive obfuscation technology and encryption used, 
we have to take into account that some of the attributes that requires deep packet inspection 
will not be able to detect some bot traffic, and thus should be weighed differently. 
5.6 Host attributes 
Host-based attributes need to be captured using multiple methods. We could run host 
monitoring tools such as Sebek (Sebek, 2010) in a host that provide some of the host-based 
DNA, for example: list of dll and system files created, registry entries modifies, their 
modification dates, running processes, etc. This information and the analysis code that 
computes the host DNA could reside on the host. But there is an inherent problem in 
capturing host infections.  
No data obtained using analysis tools already present on a host once it has been infected can 
be trusted. Moreover, the infected host could modify results sent by the infected host. For 
example most bots such as storm, rxbot and rustock use rootkits to modify results obtained 
using windows system API to hide monitoring of processes, network connections, file 
visibility and file sizes. Similarly Conficker (Porras et al., 2009) modifies in memory versions 
of windows system API leaving the actual dll file on disk untouched. This leads us to the 
case for using mobile agents. 
5.7 The case for mobile agents 
The main reason why using a mobile agent based approach is viable in host-based 
behavior detection is the fact that if our evidence gathering code is already available on an 
infected node, we cannot trust its result. Thus in order to analyze a host, our evidence 
gathering code has to travel to the host being analyzed. This could be the code which 
computes an MD5 hash of some important system files, or retrieve analysis data stored in 
a pseudo random file stored on the host in an encrypted format to hide from the infection 
code, or the code that detects the presence of rootkitted files similar to Rootkit Revealer or 
Rootkit Unhooker. Similarly, if more than one host exhibits similar malicious activities, or if 
multiple network sensors are deployed, mobile agents would allow processing of multiple 
hosts in a parallel manner, minimizing the time to detect infections. Mobile agents would 
allow us to replace outdated monitoring agents, with new agent code that has updated 
tracking abilities.  
5.8 Protecting the agent and the infected host 
An approach that can be taken to protect the infected host from malicious agent is the use of 
strong asymmetric cryptography. Some mobile agent platforms such as Grasshopper and 
Aglets allow only agent code signed and verified to run on a given host with access control 
policies. Using strong asymmetric key to sign the agent and its verification by the infected 
host environment would protect the host. 
Similarly, once the agent performs its analysis task, the mobile agent would travel back to 
the analyzing host where it would be marked as tainted. The analyzing host could perform a 
check such as performing an MD5 hash on the agent to see that the agent code has not been 
modified before its results are processed.  
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Any agent travelling to an infected host also has to verify that the agent middleware has not 
been compromised in any way before starting its processing. The absence of an agent 
middleware that is supposed to exist could act as a sign of maliciousness. Using Aglets 
agent middleware has the added advantage of us being able to add functionality to the 
agent middleware as required since it is open-sourced. 
5.9 Feature extraction (infection score) 
Though we rely on measuring the various network and host-based attributes, not all 
attributes have equal weight in detecting botnet communication or activity. Moreover 
certain botnet families exhibit higher frequency of a certain attribute versus others. For 
example, certain attributes such as the use of fast-flux for communication or a user machine 
exhibiting SMTP traffic are symtoms of botnet behavior in case of botnets such as Storm and 
Waledac, but these features may not be utilized by IRC based bots such as Agobot. Thus, we 
see that not all attributes should be weighed equally for all botnets. 
One approach would be to partition the features into multiple sets each assigned to a weight 
category, or each feature assigned an individual appropriate weight. This would constitute a 
part of feature extraction, where certain features are brought into focus while other probably 
noise given less emphasis. Whereas taking the first approach is easier, it is also prone to 
more inaccuracy. The second approach is more accurate but harder to compute.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Computing an infection score for a botnet infected host 
The second approach could be accomplished by using Support Vector Machine (SVM), a 
supervised machine learning approach which is less prone to noise in the data sample. 
Creating an SVM for each bot family, and comparing the host DNA to each bot family SVM 
would allow us to measure which bot a host behaves like. The purpose of an SVM is to 
compute an optimal hyperplane that separates one class of n-dimensional points from 
another class (Rieck et al., 2008). Thus the main reason for using SVM in our case would be 
to compute actual weight assignments. This allows us to compute the infection score as 
shown in figure 4 where SN(h) is the computed infection score. 
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A host that exhibits a higher infection score, and if the infection score exceeds a threshold 
score set by an administrator, would automatically trigger a correlation requirement of host 
and network features exhibited and a further analysis.  
Similarly, if the host or network DNA exhibits similar patterns to a known infection (based 
on distance measurement) after clustering bot behavior, it would also trigger a DNA-based 
correlation. 
5.10 Scenario of use 
In this section we describe the scenario of use of our approach. 
A system administrator will receive continuous updating of the DNA sequencing of a given 
host and its probability of infection. The network-based DNA of a host will be updated 
based on the network traffic seen by the snort-inline processor. The host-based DNA will be 
reported periodically by individual hosts within the local network. 
If the probability of the host being infected crosses a certain threshold based on the infection 
score, or a host approaches a DNA match close to a botnet, a bot correlation trigger flag will 
be raised.  
Based on the infection model seen, a mobile agent would be created with the required host-
detection functionality.  
The agent would be deployed to the infected host, where it would perform analysis tasks as 
described in earlier sections. If the infected host denies a real agent to run, this could be a 
sign of maliciousness. 
The agent could return with advanced-detailed results such as an encrypted list of 
rootkitted processes/files, or just the host-based DNA results. The agent is placed in the 
tainted bin, to verify the integrity of the agent, since it had travelled to a probable infected 
host. If the agent has retained its integrity its results are measured to be valid. 
Based on both the host and network-based results, the node could block all 
incoming/outgoing network traffic by automatically modifying snort-inline for the given 
host. It could also provide details such as if the infection matches a known botnet, or is a 
new botnet pattern. It would also allow us to correlate hosts that have exhibited similar bot 
behavior pattern. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have primarily focused on the various mechanisms utilized by botnet 
owners to maintain and protect their botnets; and the defensive mechanisms designed by 
researchers to study, detect and dismantle the malicious botnets. As can be understood, 
botnets utilize multiple advanced technologies that are constantly updated. Hence we have 
proposed the use of mobile agents which too can be constantly updated to defend against 
the ever changing behavior of bot binaries. 
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